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ABSTRACT 
It has long been known that ‘good’ architecture and quality design are 
public goods, as they have been shown to increase surrounding 
property values, create a sense of community, and provide a catalyst for 
future development.  What is less clearly understood is the individual 
user’s demand and willingness to pay for good architecture;   if there is 
a positive externality to quality architecture on the surrounding buildings, 
tenants, and bystanders, then there must exist a ‘socially optimal’ level 
of design that may or may not be equal to the optimal level as measured 
by the private market.  Through interviews with industry leaders and 
policy makers, and a careful reading of relevant literature, this study 
seeks to investigate the discrepancy between the socially and privately 
optimal levels of design, and to determine the degree to which ‘good’ 
architects or ‘good’ architecture can affect private returns to private 
developers or owners.  
More simply put:  does there exist a private market for ‘good’ 
architecture within the market for real estate? 
Thesis Supervisor:  Lynn Fisher 
Title:  Assistant Professor of Real Estate 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The external form of a building is generally neither rival nor excludable, 
and therefore can usually be considered a public good.  In fact, there is 
little doubt that ‘good’ or ‘high quality’ architecture is a public good, one 
that creates positive externalities for the surrounding structures and 
communities. (Bourassa et al.)  This concept of quality architecture as a 
public good explains, in part, the existence of historic districts, design 
reviews, planning boards, and government-imposed aesthetic 
requirements for permitting.  It is also generally accepted that, as a 
whole, the construction and design costs to produce ‘good’ architecture 
are higher than those required to produce buildings that are of a more 
questionable or less ‘unique’ design quality. (Lane and Vandell, Hough 
and Kratz)  If there is a positive externality to quality architecture on the 
surrounding buildings, tenants, and bystanders, then there must exist a 
‘socially optimal’ level of design that may or may not be equal to the 
optimal level as measured by the private market.  The quest here is to 
investigate the discrepancy between the socially and privately optimal 
levels of design, and to determine the degree to which ‘good’ architects 
or ‘good’ architecture can affect private returns to private developers or 
owners. More simply put:  does there exist a private market for ‘good’ 
architecture within the market for real estate? 
  7
 
 
 
1.1 Two Interacting Markets:  Products and Inputs 
A private market for good architecture can only exist if the users of the 
building have a willingness to pay that is higher than the opportunity 
cost to the developer of creating such buildings.    Thus there are two 
main market functions 
at work:  the demand 
for space and the 
demand for the inputs 
that create space. 
(Figure 1.1.1)  Users 
(and the community) 
demand a certain 
amount and quality of 
space, and that space is supplied via production by supply-side agents, 
such as developers, landlords, and, to a lesser extent, homeowners and 
      
   1             
Demand Production Inputs 
• Users 
• Community 
 
demand 
→←
supply 
• Developers  
• Builders 
• Landlords 
• Homeowners
demand
→←
supply
• Architectural 
services 
• Land 
• Materials 
• Labor 
• Capital 
                 2    
Figure 1.1.1:  Interacting Market Functions 
Source:  Adapted from Green and Malpezzi 
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renters.1 (Green and Malpezzi)  Based on the level of demand for space, 
supply-side agents will demand a certain level and quality of the inputs 
of space.  Architecture and quality design are inputs of space that are 
demanded by the developer so as to supply high-quality designed space 
to users.  The level of design demanded by the developer is based in 
part on the perceived private user level of demand for high quality 
design2.   It is necessary, then, to not only understand the supply of 
quality architecture, but also the demand drivers for the consumption of 
this architecture.  In an efficient market free of externalities, the supply 
and demand for quality architecture between the developer and users 
should always be equal; however, with the ‘public good’ nature of 
architecture, in the face of externalities there is always the possibility of 
a market failure.  A market failure occurs when there exists a gap 
between the level of quality design demanded by the users of the space 
 
1 Homeowners and renters can be considered supply-side agents because they 
demand the inputs of housing services in order to maintain and upgrade their 
homes.  Homeowners and renters, however, will be largely ignored in the context of 
this paper due to their relatively minor use of architectural services. 
2 There are other factors that affect the level of design supplied, such as community 
and government regulations, which will be discussed later in this paper. 
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and the total social demand.3 If supply does not equal the socially 
optimal level of good design, what methods can local authorities use to 
decrease the opportunity costs or increase the financial returns to 
developers such that the supply of quality architecture is equal to the 
total social demand rather than the private demand only? 
In response to the demands of the users of space, the developer will 
likewise demand a certain level of service at any given price, while the 
architect in turn will supply a certain level of service at any given price.  
The architect’s supply should be partially based on his or her cost of 
providing such services, determined by the opportunity cost of inputs 
such as labor, materials, time, etc.  The developer’s demand for such 
services in an income-producing property will be based mostly on the 
perceived return he or she will gain from an investment in these 
services.  The economics of housing services assumes that both the 
producers and users of space are price-takers.  (Green and Malpezzi)  
 
3 Total social demand is the socially optimal level and defined as the total demand of 
space users and the demand of bystanders, passersby, and neighbors.  All persons 
or groups who receive a utility from the space but do not pay for it will be referred to 
as “the community.” 
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In a competitive market with few barriers to entry or large economies of 
scale, only the developer’s actions should affect his/her final return.  
However, as the users of space demand more quality-designed space, 
the developer’s demand for good architectural services should increase 
in response, as his return may be critically affected by the actions of the 
architect.  This increase in demand for architectural services should, at 
least in the short-term, increase both the supply and cost of the services 
provided by architects.  In fact, with a differentiated product, the 
increase in cost should be even greater, as each architect has a ‘mini 
monopoly’ on his or her ‘style’ and services.  However, given the 
commonly known fact that architecture is not a high-return profession, 
what is it about the relationship between developer and architect that 
seems to defy the laws of economics?   
To answer this and other questions, this paper will first examine the 
existing literature pertaining to the market for quality architecture, 
including the supply and demand drivers associated with the creation of 
such buildings within the public and private markets.   As good 
architecture can be considered an amenity rather than a necessity, the 
paper will also examine the body of literature related to the pricing of 
various other amenities within the residential market.  Next, with the 
goal of understanding the supply and demand drivers behind the 
creation of good architecture, the paper will then cover necessary 
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background information related to the contractual governance structure 
of architectural services between owner, architect, and contractor, as 
well as the typical financial billing principles related to such services.  
Finally, after a series of case discussions of recent Boston-area 
development projects, the paper will conclude with suggestions for 
future study. 
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2.0 DEMAND AND THE MARKET FOR “GOOD” ARCHITECTURE 
There are obvious social benefits to good architecture; neighborhood 
gentrification, increased property values, increased tourism and foot-
traffic, and increased safety, to name a few.  However, most buildings 
are funded and developed by private individuals, and not from society as 
a whole.  This obviously creates the potential for a free-rider problem, 
as there is potentially no incentive for the neighbor, who will benefit from 
increased property values, to pay for good architecture.  Thus the 
socially optimal level of good design might diverge from what is privately 
optimal.  Short of government intervention, however, the socially optimal 
level will never be reached unless there is a private benefit from, and a 
private demand for quality architecture. 
2.1 Public and Private Valuation of “Good” Architecture 
The question of good architecture is a question of the relative benefits 
and costs of architecture’s stakeholders.  As each stakeholder’s value 
proposition is different, it is first necessary to understand both the public 
and private values and costs associated with good architecture. While 
the focus of this paper will be on the market for quality design within the 
private real estate market, it is necessary to also understand the 
relationship between the public and private demand for such 
architecture.  However, the question of design has been studied very 
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little within an urban or spatial economic context, and thus precious few 
academic articles exist on the subject for any market.  (Lane and 
Vandell)  The lack of multiple studies on the question could be based on 
the difficulty of obtaining data, but is more likely the result of the 
difficulty in quantifying or defining “quality design” as an amenity, as it is 
often a question of subjective perception.  Likewise, the value gained or 
created through quality architecture is not always financial or direct, but 
can take on many forms; in assessing the value of good design, one 
must take into account not only economic value, but social and 
environmental value as well.  These various forms of value can add 
difficulty to the quantification of design, as the indirect value can often 
be as great as the direct financial value achieved through design.  
Finally, while the value of design is relative between stakeholders, it is 
also relative to other factors imposed on the architecture, such as 
market conditions, the building’s use and use groups, as well as the 
local political climate.  (Carmona, et al.) 
As the various stakeholders associated with the building will define the 
costs and values for themselves, it is the goal of this thesis, in part, to 
investigate those costs and values, and determine the extent to which 
they affect the production of good design.  A clear comprehension of 
each stakeholder’s costs and values is necessary to understand the 
decision-making process of design within the context of real estate 
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development.  As the genesis of a building is a long and complicated 
process, involving many factors and many players, the costs and 
benefits of each must be aligned properly for the building to come to life.  
As the costs and values change relative to the market, the resultant 
quality and character of the architecture should, in turn, also change.  
For example, the developer’s values and costs are relative to both the 
cost of construction and the value of the end product; as the demand for 
high-rise housing increases, and at the same time the cost of steel falls, 
the market should see an increase in high-rise construction.  However, if 
the both the demand for high-rise housing and the cost of steel rose, an 
increase in supply would only arise if the value to the user/buyer rose 
more than the cost to the developer.  Likewise, as the value of mixed-
use property rises for a municipality, the economic or opportunity costs 
for developers will fall for mixed-use property as permitting and 
entitlement becomes faster and easier, resulting in an increase of 
mixed-use property.  Thus the benefit and costs of each individual 
stakeholder is relative to the benefits and costs to each other 
stakeholder. 
Although not always historically the case, developers are beginning to 
see the market value of good design. Some developers have speculated 
that quality landscape alone can account for a 5% premium in rents or 
sales over the competition, while others attribute as much as a 15% 
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increase in return to quality landscape. (Bookout)  Thus good design will 
continue to be a priority as long as the costs to the developer are less 
than the value to the user.   
To understand the value of good design of each stakeholder, one must 
examine the issues relevant to each party.  Through case studies, 
readings, and discussions with users, architects, and developers, this 
thesis identifies four key issues relevant, to varying degrees, to each 
stakeholder.4 
1. Direct economic performance:  the pure investment value of the 
project based on rents or sales, vacancy and absorption, among 
others measures. 
2.  Direct operational performance:  the value associated with the 
design of the building in so far as it adds to, or subtracts from, the 
operating efficiency and value of the building.  This could include 
management, image, and security, among others. 
 
4 Adapted from Carmona, et al.’s “Six Key Issues.” 
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3. Cost of design and implementation:  refers to the direct and 
indirect economic costs associated with design such as 
production costs, infrastructure, low-income housing 
requirements, and duration and cost of approval process. 
4. Social costs and benefits: refers to the direct and indirect value of 
the development on a wider economic scale such as:  safety/ 
sense of security, sense of place, area and neighborhood 
revitalization.  Social costs also include the environmental value, 
which is the portion of the building value that is affected by its 
design and construction as it relates to the environment.  
Commonly referred to as ‘green’ architecture, this value can refer 
to energy consumption, accessibility (transit-oriented design, etc.) 
and sustainable construction techniques. 
Likewise, the identification of each stakeholder is necessary to property 
align the costs and values.  Carmona, et al. identified the following as 
key stakeholders in most development projects: 
1. Investors, both long and short-term:  construction and long-term 
debt providers, equity investors. 
2. Developers 
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3. Designers:  architects, landscape architects, engineers, and all 
other design professionals associated with, and receiving fees 
from, a development project. 
4. Occupiers:  users in the form of tenants or owners. 
5. Local Authority:  the town, municipality, or other authority that will 
both benefit and bear some of the costs of the development. 
6. Community:  society as a whole that is affected by the 
development project.5   
The relationships among all of these groups will interact to influence 
either the cost or payoffs from the development project; clearly for a 
well-designed development to move forward, the perception must be 
that the costs and values for each group are balanced, both in the long 
 
5 The extent to which a community is considered a stakeholder in a project is variable.  
A small development in a rural location may have little effect on anybody, while a 
project such as the World Trade Center site in Manhattan is of interest to a large 
number of people all over the world. 
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term and the short term.  Again, using a table similar to that found in 
Carmona, et al., coupled with qualitative evidence gleaned from 
readings and discussions, the following summary chart of the benefits 
and costs of good design can be established: 
 Benefits Costs 
 Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term 
Investors 
• Investment 
security 
• Higher revenue 
returns 
• Increased asset 
value 
• Easier/ Cheaper 
Maintenance 
• Increased re-
sale value 
• Continued 
attraction of 
high-quality 
tenants 
• Potentially 
higher initial 
investment 
• Potential for 
more complex 
management, 
especially in 
mixed use 
projects 
Developers 
• Faster 
Permitting 
• Greater chance 
of variance 
• Less public 
opposition 
• Greater product 
differentiation 
• Ease of 
attracting 
investors 
• Increased/ 
sustained 
reputation 
• Ease of 
attracting future 
investors and 
support 
• Higher 
construction 
and design 
costs. 
• Increased 
design and 
construction 
time 
 
Designers 
• Increased work 
load and billing 
opportunities/ 
increased 
revenue 
• Increased/ 
sustained 
reputation 
  
Occupiers 
 • Better recruiting 
and workforce 
retention 
• Increased 
productivity 
 • Higher rents 
for higher 
quality 
buildings 
  19
 
 
• Reduced 
security 
expenditures 
• Reduced 
energy usage 
and cost 
• Increased 
prestige 
Local 
Authority 
• Potential to 
encourage 
other 
development 
• Increased 
economic 
viability for 
surrounding 
community 
• Increased tax 
revenue 
• Reduced public 
expenditures on 
crime 
prevention, 
urban 
management 
• Higher public 
investment in 
design 
guidance and 
advice 
 
Community 
• Few benefits 
until completion 
of building 
• Could 
potentially 
provide jobs 
during 
construction 
• Increased 
cultural vitality 
• Increased 
public pride 
• Reinforced 
sense of place 
• Increased 
property prices 
• If “green,” 
reduced 
exposure to 
harmful 
pollutants, 
overall increase 
in 
environmental 
health. 
• Increased 
construction 
noise, pollution 
and 
disturbances 
• Threat of 
gentrification, 
especially 
harmful for 
renters. 
Figure 2.1.1:  Costs and Benefits for Development Stakeholders 
Source:  Adapted from Carmona, et al. 
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As previously stated, the benefits of one group must balance the costs 
of the other, and vice versa, while at the same time, the costs and 
benefits within each group must also balance.  The values for occupiers, 
such as increased prestige and increased worker productivity, must be 
equal to or greater than the costs to the developer, but at the same time, 
those benefits to the occupier must be greater than their own cost of 
obtaining such benefits, such as increased rent.  Likewise, the benefit of 
the community’s increased property values must be greater than the 
threat of gentrification.6   
However, not only do the costs and values of the various stakeholders 
need to be aligned, but their time horizons must be aligned as well.  
Historically, much of the problem with creating good design has been 
that the cost to the developer is incurred in the short-term, but the value 
to the user and the public is mostly achieved in the long-term.  This is 
especially true when the developer does not plan to hold the building for 
the long-term, but rather to sell it off either as a merchant-builder or in 
 
6 This, however, is usually the case when the majority of a neighborhood is owner- 
occupiers, rather then renters.  It is common, however, for renters to get ‘priced-out’ 
of a recently gentrified community. 
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the form of condo sales.  For the developer to spend on good design, 
the entire direct and indirect long-term value to the user or buyer must 
be discounted back to the present, and that value must compensate the 
developer for his or her short-term expenditure on design.  This can only 
happen, however, if the user (buyer) recognizes the value attributed to 
good design, and is willing to capitalize not only the future financial 
value, but intangibles such as safety and security, cache or image, and 
the overall feeling of well-being associated with quality design.  Thus the 
developer’s goals are predominately short-term and quantifiable, 
whereas both the user’s and community’s goals are often long-term and 
intangible.  Carmona, et al. discuss the misalignment of these goals, 
and suggest that through study and education, they can be realigned: 
Unfortunately, in a contemporary development climate, 
commercial pressures often seem to militate against long-
term investment in design quality.  The problem is often 
compounded because decisions regarding the built 
environment are often made by those far removed from 
their impact on the ground.  In [other countries] in the 
recent past the result has contributed to a marginalization 
of …design and to a perception that better design 
generates costs without a view that these might be offset by 
any benefits.  Nevertheless, by demonstrating that better 
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design sits on the positive side of the balance sheet, a 
change in private as well as public decisions might 
potentially be secured. (146) 
The question of design is, at least in part, one of aligning the costs and 
benefits of each player, in both the long- and the short-term.  If the value 
of good design to the user is capitalized into the value of the property, 
the developer’s profit should reflect this fact.  Likewise, if an increase in 
profit is attributable to design, the architect’s fee (and profit) should also 
rise, reflecting this increase in value.  However, the architect must only 
be compensated for an increase in value if that increase is real and 
greater than the cost of obtaining such increase.  A few researchers, 
nevertheless, argue that the increase in value does not necessarily 
exist, but only exists as a lottery; a chance that value will be increased.  
As design costs are sunk before the increase in value is determined, the 
risk of not achieving an elevated value is raised, which in turn should 
actually lower the compensation of the architect.  
At the very least, it can be shown that the value to surrounding buildings 
is ‘real,’ as a few studies have examined the value of a view on property 
values.  Through hedonic regression using multiple dummy variables for 
different quality and view types in Washington State, Bensen, et al. 
determined that the willingness to pay for a view is quite high, but that 
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the premium depends not only on the view itself, but on the quality and 
type of view.  High quality ocean views were found to increase the 
market price of a home by as much as 60%, while views of a lower 
quality were only found to increase market price by 8%.  The authors 
also determined that the value of an ocean view of any quality is 
inversely proportional to the distance from the water.  Bourassa, et al. 
employed a similar methodology to the Bensen study, using multiple 
dummy variables for different views in New Zealand rather than a single 
one to simply represent ‘view’ or ‘no view.’ The authors found that wide 
views (i.e. “high quality” in Bensen) added an average of 59% to the 
value of a property.  The paper also studied the effect of non-water 
views, finding a 27% increase in price for views of attractive 
surroundings and a 37% increase in property values for units with views 
of attractive buildings.  When taken in the context of this thesis, the 
paper shows that exogenous features surrounding a building have an 
effect on property values, including near-by quality architecture.  Neither 
paper, however, makes any mention of the endogenous features, such 
as attractive facades, and the effect those features have on rents for the 
buildings themselves.  However, ultimately the studied concluded that, 
“aesthetic externalities are multidimensional and can have a substantial 
impact on residential property values.”  According to the authors, users 
are willing to pay for views of good architecture. Clearly there is a social 
and community benefit to good architecture.  However, as an occupier, 
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one actually gains little value from the aesthetic components of the 
façade; thus the potential for a free-rider problem exists. Are buyers 
willing to pay to actually own that which creates the externality, rather 
than simply enjoy if from afar? 
This issue of the gap between the social demand and the private 
demand for quality architecture has been studied very little.  To this 
author’s knowledge, two studies have directly studied the question of 
private demand and valuation by examining the potential added value of 
“good” design on a sample of commercial office buildings.  First, Lane 
and Vandell (1989) examined 102 Class A office buildings in Boston and 
Cambridge in a “preliminary attempt to evaluate empirically the nature of 
the contribution of architectural quality to the value of buildings.”  The 
authors collected data on design quality for the buildings in the sample 
via surveys completed by a panel of local architects.  This methodology 
produced results via hedonic regression that showed that buildings rated 
in the top 20% for design quality were predicted to command rents 
almost 22% higher than the bottom quintile, but showed a weak 
relationship between vacancy and design quality.  
The authors then briefly examined the construction costs of good design 
and found that, on average, buildings of higher rated architectural 
quality cost more to produce.  Through this brief examination of 
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construction costs, and a series of point estimates of rent, vacancy, and 
construction, they ultimately found that good design “may not be more 
profitable on average, but as with a lottery, may provide a small 
probability of a high return to the developer.”   
Lane and Vandell concern themselves only with the aesthetic quality of 
architecture, making a careful distinction between the external 
appearance of the building that they are studying, and the functionalism 
of the building, which is not taken into consideration in their paper.  
Although the non-excludable nature of good architecture does not 
extend beyond the exterior façade or any public spaces (e.g., lobby, 
commercial space) the functionalism and internal quality are a great part 
of what a buyer is purchasing.  Although the user/buyer is purchasing 
the right to the exterior quality of the architecture, they are also 
purchasing the right to utilize the functional quality.  Nevertheless, their 
results do point to a private market for good design, and suggest that, 
buyers are, in fact, actually willing to pay for that which creates the 
positive externality.  Obviously, according to Vandell and Lane, the 
value of that “cache” to the user is greater than the cost to the developer 
of supplying such aesthetic quality. 
Ultimately, the greatest flaw in the paper is their method of identifying 
the quality of architecture.  They correctly state the subjective nature of 
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their task, but fail to truly translate that into an objective measurement.  
The authors state that, “market participants would perhaps provide the 
most direct proxy measure, though they may rely upon designer’s 
opinions as the arbiters of design tastes.”  The authors thus assume that 
opinions of local award-winning architects are therefore an accurate 
measure of design quality, and proceed to gather data via 
questionnaires of 80 Boston-area architects.  Ultimately they received 
28 completed surveys, for a response rate of 35%.   
The errors in this methodology are many:  First, while a response rate of 
35% is to be expected, 28 surveys is simply not enough for an accurate, 
objective analysis of “quality”.  Secondly, all the architects surveyed 
were local architects commenting on local buildings, many of which they 
had designed themselves.  It is impossible to tell if the 28 respondents 
were in fact the design architects themselves, in which case it could be 
imagined that they might rate their own designs higher than truly 
warranted.  If a similar methodology were to be used, it might be more 
relevant to select a panel of non-local architects with no connection to 
the sample buildings.  Finally, as the buildings were rated after 
completion and lease-up, it is difficult to ascertain if the respondents, at 
least subconsciously, were awarding the status of “high design quality” 
to buildings that were simply successful on a financial or marketing 
level.  To reach a truly objective quantification of quality, it is necessary 
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to isolate the architectural quality itself, rather than attaching the 
concept of quality to structures that succeed on other levels (i.e. 
financial or economic).  These flaws notwithstanding, their results do 
suggest the existence of a private market for quality architecture.   
Next (although not chronologically), Hough and Kratz (1983), while 
suffering from a flaws similar to that in the aforementioned article, 
frames a question very similar this paper, although exclusively in the 
commercial office market rather than the greater real estate market: 
In this paper we ask whether the positive externality of 
‘good’ architecture can be internalized; in particular, is the 
value of ‘good’ architecture reflected in the rental rates of 
commercial office structures in downtown Chicago?  …can 
we establish whether or not office tenants value ‘good’ 
architecture at any positive price?  (41) 
The Hough and Kratz article, like the Lane and Vandell one, looks at the 
question from the side of demand, rather than the supply side of the 
equation.  They begin by establishing five features of a building that may 
influence the demand for office space, with architectural quality being 
only one of them.  The other four are listed as; “distance from the center 
of the CBD, distance from commuting centers, building responsiveness, 
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amenities and dis-amenities.”  It is by estimating each factor’s separate 
impact that they are able to isolate the effect of architectural quality on 
the demand for office space, and thus office rents. 
The methodology used is one of hedonic regression in which various 
measures to control for the five features are regressed against the 
dependant variable of average rental price in 1978 (dollars per square 
foot) of 139 office buildings in Chicago.  The study uses various directly 
observable measures to account for the first four of the five factors, and 
introduces a number of measures to account for architectural quality.  
New buildings are considered as being architecturally significant if they 
have been so recognized by some “official” authority. 
Ultimately the study found that buildings with Chicago landmark status 
rent for $0.81 per square foot less than an otherwise similar building 
without such designation.  However, this variable was not statistically 
significant, but at the very least, “it can be said that landmark status 
does not increase the equilibrium rent.”  However, the study did find 
there to be a statistically signification premium of $1.85 per square foot 
(in 1978 dollars) for buildings that had been given the Chicago AIA 
award. Although the paper does mention that the “good” buildings cost 
more to build and design, the differential was well below the capitalized 
value of $1.85 per square foot.  The authors ultimately conclude that 
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because the AIA status is not conferred until after a building is 
complete, while the higher cost of construction is incurred before such 
status, architectural quality is akin to a lottery, and the premium simply 
represents the risk necessary to compensate owners for the gamble of 
achieving such quality.  Ultimately, it is unclear if the rent premium was 
due to higher quality of architecture, or simply due to the increased 
publicity from the AIA award.  If, however, the increase in rent is due to 
the increased publicity from the AIA award, does this suggest a 
reputation or ‘branding’ effect that carries beyond the building to the 
architects themselves?  If so, the chance of a rent premium for quality 
architecture could be increased simply by choosing an architect that had 
previously won an award.  If this rent premium could be attributed to the 
architects themselves, rather than the architecture, it would be expected 
that the demand for an ‘award-winning’ architect would be in higher 
demand than that for a ‘non-award-winning’ one, and thus the ‘award-
winning’ architect could charge higher fees due to this increase in 
demand. 
Ultimately both papers suggest a rent premium associated with quality 
architecture within the commercial market.  They show that, in general, 
the user is willing to pay more for quality architecture than it costs the 
developer to create it.  While this suggests an alignment of developer’s 
  30
 
 
short-term costs and the user’s long-term value, it is also necessary to 
examine the question in the context of the residential market. 
2.2 Pricing Amenities in the Residential Market 
As stated previously, few studies have been conducted on the value of 
quality architecture within the private market.  However, due to both the 
regular appraisal of residential buildings and the requirements of 
apraising, and the generally public nature of residential sales prices, 
much work has been done to the study of the effect of other individual 
amenities on residential prices. (Hough and Kratz) Most studies have 
examined different amenities and their value on home prices, such the 
value of views, Victorian Architecture, or parks. Most studies have found 
that, at least within the residential market, most amenities are in fact 
capitalized into the sales price of the home.  This paper will rely heavily 
on the results of these studies, and methodology for valuing such 
amenities within the housing market. In the final conclusion, this paper 
will seek to adopt that methodology into a suggestion for a quantitative 
study of the market for ‘good’ architecture.  
Song and Knaap (2003) examined the price of residential real estate in 
“new urbanist” neighborhoods, the current trend in suburban muliti-plot 
design, versus that of modern neighborhoods.  The authors used GIS 
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(Geographic Information Systems) to develop quantitative measures of 
urban form, such as street design and circulation, density, land use mix, 
accessibility, transportation mode choice and pedestrian walk-ability, 
which were then incorporated into a hedonic price regression.  
Combined with a series of variables to control for influences on price 
other than that of urban form, the authors concluded the value 
difference between traditional and new urbanist neighborhoods is 
measurable and is in fact capitalized into residential property values.  
They found that buyers were willing to pay a premium for more and 
smaller blocks, proximity to operating light rail stations, and better 
pedestrian connectivity.  They also found that the premium more than 
compensates for the price discount due to the smaller size of new 
urbanist lots.  Ultimately, the authors concluded the paper, saying: 
More importantly, our results show that the price premium, 
or discount, of any particular neighborhood depends on the 
particular design characteristics it has to offer.  In short, 
design matters.  (236) 
Thus the authors found that, not only are people willing to pay for an 
increase in aesthetics, they are willing to pay for an increase in 
functionality.  In this study, in contrast to Vandell and Lane, the 
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aesthetics and functionality of the project cannot be separated, for it is 
the interaction between the two for which the market is paying. 
Next, Moorehouse and Smith (1994) examined the market for residential 
architecture using 131 row houses in the South End neighborhood of 
Boston.  They point to the Vandell and Lane and Hough and Kratz 
articles, but in contrast to those, which use proxies for architectural 
quality, Moorehouse and Smith directly estimate the value of each 
architectural style and feature found in the South End.  Although the 
authors make no claims on the ‘quality’ of the designs, they did find that 
the housing characteristics included in the study accounted for 88% of 
the price variance across the row houses.  Most surprisingly, they found 
that specific architectural features were more highly valued when they 
differentiated one row house from its immediate neighbors.  The 
conclusion of this paper is quite strong when taken in the context of the 
thesis at hand:  although the exterior façade of a building is an 
externality, the users themselves benefit from differentiation afforded by 
the architecture.  If the assumption that ‘good’ architecture is, at least in 
part, ‘unique’ architecture, then it must be that users would be willing to 
pay for a differentiation between projects. 
Although these studies point to the fact that users are willing to pay for 
quality design, both the value of that quality and the cost of producing 
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that quality are relative to other market forces. However, if value 
increases with increasing qualities of design, so should the cost of 
creating such design.  In theory, as the cost of supplying good design 
must equal the value or the demand for good design, there must exist an 
‘optimal’ level of design, beyond which the cost of producing the design 
is less than the demand, and below which the demand is greater than 
the cost. 
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3.0 CONSTRUCTION, COSTS AND GOVERNANCE OF DESIGN 
SERVICES:  THE SUPPLY OF DESIGN 
The three main factors affecting the design of a building are the cost 
construction, the cost of design, and the governance of the relationship 
between owner, designer and contractor.  The contracting method and 
billing (costs) will determine the extent to which the designer is allowed 
to input the time necessary to create the best building possible.  If the 
designer is contracted with a fixed fee, above which he/she will receive 
no additional pay, it should not be in their best economic interest to work 
beyond the exhaustion of this fixed fee.  However, in the absence of a 
fixed fee, the owner is open to a greater risk, and must be compensated 
accordingly.  It must be shown that the owner is compensated for the 
risks associated with increased design quality. 
3.1 The Value of Planning and Design in Construction 
Although few studies have been completed on the market for 
architectural design services and the value of ‘good’ design, a fair 
number of papers have been published on the value of planning within 
the construction and engineering fields.  All point to an ‘optimal’ level of 
design to achieve the best results, such that any point below the optimal 
is too low, while any point above the optimal is no longer cost effective. 
Beyond the optimal, most times the increase in value does not 
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necessarily increase proportionally with the increased spending on 
planning, while in other situations this increase can actually lead to 
deterioration in results due to over-planning.  While not directly parallel 
to the study at hand in this thesis, lessons can be learned from these 
studies as they relate to the determination of an optimal level of 
planning and the calculation or quantification of ‘quality’ or ‘best results.’ 
In most circumstances, increases in design quality increase the project 
budget.  Taken to extremes, imagine a situation where the developer 
spent nothing on design:  although he or she would have plenty left for 
construction, there would be no design, and therefore no resulting 
building.7  Obviously the user demand for nothing is zero, and the return 
to the developer would also be zero.  This is the situation when the 
developer ‘passes’ on a project.  Nothing ventured, and nothing gained. 
Now imagine a situation where the developer spent their entire budget 
on design.  Although the design would most certainly be spectacular, 
there would be nothing left in the budget for construction, and thus, once 
 
7 This example assumes that a design is required to build a building, which is usually, 
although not always, the case. 
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again, there would be no resultant building.  Although the developer 
would have already sunk the cost of design, there is still no building.   
Again, the demand for nothing is zero and the income to the developer 
would still be zero.  This is often the case when the developer “passes” 
on a project after the building has been designed.   
In both cases no building is produced and, as a result, no income is 
generated from the building.  Although for any market condition or 
segment, a certain level of design and building is demanded by users, 
the developer has nothing to offer due to the fact that either too little or 
too much was spent on design.  These hypothetical situations suggest 
parabolic relationship between the independent level of design 
expenditures, and the dependant level of income generated that can be 
attributed specifically to the design.  Although at both ends there is an 
income or return of zero, there must be a maximum return at the zenith 
of the parabolic function such that the derivative of income taken with 
respect to the design expenditure equals zero.  A point on this function 
to the left of this optimal point suggests that the demand for quality 
design is greater than the developers expenditure on design, and 
through an increase in this expenditure, the developer can increase his 
or her final return.  This situation could exist in a high-end market where 
the developer merely builds a non-descript building; although the market 
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may absorb all units, the market would most likely be willing to pay for 
an additional level of design.  Likewise, a point on this function to the 
right of the optimal level suggests that the developer has “over-spent” 
on design, and the increase in his or her return due to the design will 
actually be less than the cost of such design.         
One of the earlier 
theories of ‘optimal’ 
planning is that of 
Firdman (1991), who 
proposed that the 
optimal level of 
planning results in 
“easy implementation” 
with the highest 
percent of vision 
achieved in the 
shortest amount of 
time. (Figure 3.1.1) 
Investing too little in planning results in “implementation failures, delays, 
and planning loops,” while investing too heavily in planning results in a 
high percentage of vision achieved, but at the cost of increased 
implementation time as planners plan minute details of the project.  
Figure 3.1.1:  Diagram of Correct Planning 
Source: Faniran, et al. 
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Thus, although the intended outcome is achieved through “over 
planning”, the additional effort is wasted as the increase in “vision 
achieved” is far less than the additional planning time required.  
 In a similar theory, Neale and Neale (1989) proposed a relationship 
between project cost and project input (or planning) such that an 
increase of planning as a percentage of total construction costs does 
lower construction costs 
and direct project costs.  
(Figure 3.1.2) However, 
beyond a “saturation 
point,” the decrease in 
construction costs are not 
offset by the increase in 
planning costs, thus 
resulting in an overall 
higher total project cost 
(direct construction and 
planning costs).  Thus 
spending on planning 
beyond the saturation point (or optimal planning level) does nothing to 
reduce construction costs, but simply adds to the overhead and 
increases total project costs.  
Figure 3.1.2:  Proposed Relationship between Project 
Costs and Planning Input   
Source: Faniran, et al. 
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As opposed to the more qualitative studies mentioned previously, 
Faniran, et al. (1999) attempted to quantify the probable value of optimal 
planning for construction projects.  They began by discuss the two 
theories of construction project planning:  findings from some research 
points to a linear and direct relationship between construction planning 
and construction performance, suggesting that performance can be 
improved by larger investments in planning.  Other studies suggest a 
parabolic relationship between planning and performance, one where a 
lack of planning produces poor results, but over planning results in an 
increase in over-all project cost, thus also reducing results.  It is this 
idea of an ‘optimal’ amount of construction planning on which the 
authors focus.  
The study uses Ashely, et al.’s (1987) definition of project success, 
which the authors summarize as, “results much better than expected or 
normally observed in terms of cost, schedule, quality, safety and 
participant satisfaction.”  The authors also state that, due to a high 
degree of uncertainty inherent in the construction process, there are 
other factors that can contribute to a project’s success or failure.  Thus 
the authors focus their study on the increased or decreased chance of 
project success from an increase in planning.  They hypothesize that the 
relationship between planning and chance of success will take one of 
four forms:  the relationship will either be a positive or negative linear 
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relationship or a positive or negative curvilinear relationship. (Figure 
3.1.3)   
The authors collected data via a questionnaire sent to eighty-five 
construction firms located in Australia, with a positive response rate of 
62%.  The construction firms were asked to pick one project and answer 
a set of questions.  From their answers, variables for cost variance 
(percentage ratio of the final project cost to the original project cost) and 
time variance (percentage ratio of the final project duration to the 
original project 
duration) were 
determined, and the 
variables were fit with 
a normal curve to 
determine project 
performance.  Projects 
in the first quartile of 
either variable were 
considered to be 
“above average,” while 
those in the fourth 
quartile were deemed 
Figure 3.1.3:  Possible Relationships between Project 
Success and Planning Input 
Source:  Faniran, et al.   
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“poor performance.”  Projects between the first and third quartile were 
considered “average.”   
Logistic and linear/curvilinear regression models were used to predict 
the chance of project success (or failure) given a set of independent 
variables.  The results showed that increased planning efforts created 
an increased probability of good time performance as well as an 
increased probability of poor time performance, indicating increased 
planning has little effect on project time performance.  The authors did 
find, however, a negative parabolic relationship between an increase in 
planning and the probability of increased cost performance.  Their 
results seem to be in line with the theories of both Firdman and Neale 
and Neale, such that an increase in planning time increases the 
probability of good cost performance to a point; beyond this optimal 
point, increases in planning only serve to decrease positive cost 
performance.  By determining the cutoff point where the probability of 
poor cost performance was 0.0%, the authors determined that, based on 
this data, the optimal planning input was .72% of the total project costs.  
(Figure 3.1.4)  The authors finally conclude that, while the optimal 
planning value has inherent limitations, the results do demonstrate that 
there is exists an optimal planning level, beyond which the probability of 
poor cost performance begins to rise again, producing a result that is 
not cost-effective.      
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That the chance of poor 
performance falls with each 
increase in construction 
planning, to a point before 
rising, the same could also be 
hypothesized for architectural 
or design planning.  The 
developer or owner is willing to 
invest in an increase in 
construction planning because 
there exists an increased 
potential for a positive return.  This positive return, or increased chance 
of such, must be directly correlated with an increase in planning 
spending; otherwise the spending would be wasted.  According to 
studies referenced above, there is also a direct correlation between 
quality or unique design and return, such that an increase in quality of 
design leads to an increase in return in the form of rents or prices.  The 
question is now:  if quality design can increase the developer’s chance 
of a positive return, what can increase their chances of obtaining quality 
design?  Based on the theory of efficient markets, the answer should be 
simple:  you pay for it. 
Figure 3.1.4:  Probable Value of Optimal 
Planning Input 
Source:  Faniran et al.   
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3.2 The Cost of Design and Construction 
There are various methods of contracting and paying for design 
services.  The simplest of them is the flat fee, in which the architect 
“bids” on the design based on a clearly defined scope, and the 
developer or owner agrees to pay the architect that flat fee for the 
project design regardless of the actual cost to the architect.  This 
arrangement, while lowering the risk of cost overruns to the developer, 
provides no incentive for the architect to produce a quality design.  In 
fact, as the architect’s return is inversely proportional to the number of 
hours spent on design, it actually behooves the architect to spend less 
time on working on a design and simply produce a building that requires 
little research or experimentation.  A flat-fee contract is inherently non-
innovative; to increase the chances for quality design, the developer 
must be willing to share some of the risk of cost over-runs by allowing 
the designer to spend the time required to complete a quality design.    
Many studies have been made on the efficient or optimal allocation of 
design costs.  Hurley and Touran’s (2002) study on the cost structure 
and profitability of design firms is focused on engineering design 
contracts; however, much of their research is applicable to architectural 
design firms.  The study was based on surveys of engineering firms 
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conducted over 15 years, with the goal of quantifying the effect of 
overhead caps and non-reimbursables on firm profitability.  
The authors first identify the four major elements of cost associated with 
engineering design contracts, which parallels those of the typical 
architectural design firm: 
1. Direct salary costs are wages paid to employees for work 
performed on a specific project.  Direct Salary costs are 
calculated as hours spent multiplied by the hourly wage.  In a 
fixed fee contract, this number is estimated beforehand, and the 
architect receives this flat fee, regardless of what he/she pays out 
to their employees.  In a ‘cost plus’ contract, the owner is billed 
for these hours as they accrue, plus a predetermined multiplier to 
cover overhead and indirect costs. 
2. Indirect salary-related costs are wages or expenses paid to 
employees for work other than that performed on a specific 
project.  Such items include:  sick leave and holidays, paid 
vacation, payroll taxes, health insurance, and retirement benefits 
(e.g., 401k) 
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3. Direct non-salary costs are the expenses incurred for a specific 
project or contract.  These expenses can include:  travel and 
lodging, drawing reproduction, computer equipment, and 
subcontractor or outside consultant fees.  Some contracts are 
negotiated so that these costs are billed to the owner, regardless 
of the fee structure, and are called ‘reimbursables.’  Conversely, if 
the contract does not allow for the reimbursement of direct non-
salary costs, they are referred to as ‘non-reimbursables.’8 
4. Indirect general and administrative (G&A) are costs that, while not 
directly related to a specific project, are nonetheless necessary 
for conducting business as a whole.  Such expenses are:  
administrative wages, office rent, non-project related computers, 
general marketing, insurance, registration and licenses, office 
 
8 It is generally the case that direct non-salary costs are reimbursable, except in the 
case of some public projects. 
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supplies, taxes, utility bills, interest expense, bad debt expense, 
and training and education.9   
Both indirect salary-related costs and indirect G&A costs are usually 
expressed as percentage of direct salary costs, such that: 
CostsSalary Direct 
CostsIndirect   percentage overhead =  (3.2.1)
Hurley and Touran suggest that, due to differing accounting principles, 
overhead rates between design firms can vary considerably.  The 
authors also note that the average overhead percentage has risen 
considerably in the past 15 years, due mostly to the increased use of 
computers.  Computers generally reduce the man-hours required to 
complete a project, thus reducing direct salary costs, but the indirect 
costs have risen substantially due to the greater cost incurred for 
computers, printers, etc.  Thus without inclusion of overhead in the total 
 
9 Not all G&A expenses are reimbursable, and are individually negotiated in the 
contract.  For example, some state agencies will not pay for bad debt expense. 
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amount billed to the client, design firms would become less and less 
profitable. 
Usually the largest portion of the overhead rate is indirect labor such as 
administration and marketing.  This indirect labor is usually measured in 
a utilization rate represented as a ratio between project billable hours 
and total available hours, or billable direct salary costs to total payroll 
salary costs.  The relationship between the overhead rate (T) and the 
utilization rate (U) was presented by Norris (1987, 1990): 
U
URT −+= 0.1  (3.2.2)
…Where R is the expense ratio of both indirect salary-related expenses 
and G&A expenses to total payroll expenses.  Thus even small 
variations in the utilization (and to a lesser extent the expense ratio) can 
have large effect on the overhead rate.  Most design firms strive to 
obtain the highest possible utilization rates, but vacation and sick pay, 
marketing, and project delays, among other reasons, make it impossible 
to obtain a utilization rate of 100% for any employee.  In fact, Hurley and 
Touran state that an employee who can bill 100% of their work hours to 
a client (such as a draftsperson or CAD operator), would still only have 
a utilization rate of around 86%.  Senior staff utilization rates are usually 
between 40 and 50%, while partners or principles, who often spend 
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more time marketing the firm (i.e., non-reimbursable) than working on 
specific projects, can have a utilization rate as low as 20 to 40%.  As a 
whole, the typical design firm has a utilization rate of 0.6 to 0.7.    
The utilization rate also plays an important part in the overall earnings 
ratio (net revenue to costs) of the firm.  Again, Norris (1990) identified 
the equation: 
0.1+= R
MUC  
(3.2.3)
…Where C is the earnings ratio and M is the net fee multiplier, or ratio 
of net project revenues to direct project labor. 
Architecture firms rely heavily on the net fee multiplier, as the multiplier 
is simply the number by which all project related salaries must be 
multiplied to cover overhead, G&A, indirect salary expenses and profit.10  
This number can obviously vary from firm to firm, but acceptable ranges 
 
10 For example, if a firm has negotiated a multiplier of 3 for a specific project, a 
draftsperson earning $20 per hour would be ‘billed out’ to the client at $20 x 3 or 
$60.   
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are generally dictated by the market for architectural services.  The less 
complex a project is, such as a suburban office building or a warehouse, 
the lower the multiplier will be.  As overhead does not necessarily 
change from project to project, a lower multiplier for one job simply 
means lowered profit, al else being equal.  Thus it is in the firm’s best 
economical interest to enter into a contract with the highest possible 
multiplier, while it is in the client’s best interest to negotiate the lowest 
possible multiplier.  As fees vary from firm to firm, the owner or 
developer will choose the firm that provides the best service at the 
lowest price, in an effort to secure the highest possible chance of a 
positive or abnormally positive return.  However, due to the economics 
of supply and demand, as demand for specific firms increase, these 
firms can begin to charge higher fees in the form of a higher multiplier.  
In a perfectly functioning market, as these fees increase, demand for 
architectural services should fall to the point where the opportunity cost 
of providing such services is exactly equal to the perceived chance of an 
increased return to the developer or owner.  Thus what the developer is 
willing to pay the architect, as a percentage of the total building design, 
should be, in an efficient market, a reasonable proxy for the perceived 
quality of design. Anecdotally, this proxy makes sense, as buildings with 
little need for design, such as warehouses and self-storage facilities, 
usually cost less than 2% of the total budget to design.  On the other 
hand, many buildings receive a great benefit from quality or unique 
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design, such as a museum or a concert hall.  Design fees for these 
types of buildings can be as much as 10 to 20% of the total construction 
cost. 
It is not, however, only the architectural fees themselves that affect the 
total cost of the building design, but the contracting method chosen 
between architect, owner, and contractor. Although little research has 
been done on architectural contracts, extensive study has been 
completed on construction contracting methods.  As owner-architect 
contracts are very similar to owner-contractor contracts, an analysis of 
literature concerning the latter will be relevant to the study at hand. 
3.3 Contractual Governance of Design and Construction 
In his 1994 study, Gordon examines the “compatibility of various 
construction contracting methods with certain types of owners.” (196)  
Although he breaks the contracts into two main groups, fixed price (lump 
sum, unit price, or guaranteed maximum price) and reimbursable (cost 
plus or a fixed fee), Gordon first defines the construction contracting 
method as having four parts: 
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1. Scope.  The portion of the project tasks – design, 
construction, and finance, that is assigned to the contractor 
[or architect]. 
2. Organization.  The business entity with whom the owner 
holds a construction contract, such as a general contactor 
or a construction manager. 
3. Contract.  The agreement of how the owner will pay the 
contractor for work performed, such as a lump-sum or cost-
plus payment.  These can be divided into two major groups 
of fixed price and reimbursable contacts. 
4. Award.  The method used to select the contractor and/or 
the price, such as competitive bidding or negotiation. (196-
197) 
While Gordon states that the scope is a “byproduct of the organization 
selection,” he points to the importance of the organization, contract and 
award as the variables that should be analyzed within the context of the 
project.    
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The “traditional method,” is one in which the contractor is responsible for 
the construction of the project only, while the designer is responsible for 
the design of the project, as well as for monitoring the construction 
process.  It is within this method that a fixed or ‘lump sum’ price is 
determined before the start of construction.  The advantages of this 
method are that the scope and responsibilities of the parties are clearly 
definable, and it allows the owner control over the design.  This type of 
contract also makes the price, which is arrived at through competitive 
bidding, known before the start of construction.  Due to the bidding 
nature of the price, the owner receives the lowest possible price from 
the best possible contractor, while the contractor is guaranteed a lump 
sum, and is therefore encouraged to manage the project to the best of 
his/her ability. 
This method, as Gordon states, is “fine in many cases where the project 
is clearly definable, well and completely designed, not necessary to 
complete in less time than the standard process will take, and is unlikely 
to change during construction.”  However, Gordon suggests that, as 
projects become more complex, the traditional contracting method 
becomes less effective.  Because the lump sum price requires a 
complete set of construction documents, it is not until the end of the 
design phase that the contractor is selected.  This requires the architect 
to be ‘all-knowing’ concerning design and construction, while at the 
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same time, “liability concerns seldom allow them to gain construction 
expertise.”  As the building becomes more complex, the architect 
becomes less capable of producing a complete set of construction 
documents, and thus the contractor is not able to determine an accurate 
lump sum price.  This lump sum price creates what Gordon calls an 
“adversarial relationship and lack of teamwork,” between the designer 
and contractor, as the fixed-price “zero-sum” contract provides no 
incentive for either to cooperate. This lack of cooperation creates 
inefficiencies and a resistance to innovation.  In fact, it is estimated that 
30% of a project’s cost is due to failures in the process of design, 
construction, and management.  (Brown and Beaton, 1999)  
Puddicombe (1997) attributes this lack of integration to the differing 
goals and responsibilities of both parties.  He suggests a social 
psychological approach to integration, and, like Gordon, the use of “non-
traditional” methods of contracting.  
After an analysis of the ‘traditional method’ (General Contractor, fixed 
price) of contracting and its flaws and limitations, Gordon describes the 
non-traditional contracting methods, and how they are affected by the 
various drivers of a project: 
1. General Contractor, Reimbursable (GC-R) are similar to General 
Contactor, Fixed Price (GC-FP) contracts, except the General 
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Contractor is reimbursed for all expenses, plus a margin for profit.  
This contract most often takes the form of ‘cost-plus,’ but could 
also be a unit price contract (set cost per unit of each item), or 
Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP) in which the contactor is 
reimbursed (cost-plus), up to a previously agreed upon ‘cap,’ 
beyond which the owner cannot be charged for any additional 
costs. 
2. Construction Manger (CM) is an entity that is neither the 
contractor nor the owner, but who oversees the construction 
process and acts as a consultant to the owner. 
3. Multiple Primes (MP) is a situation where multiple contractors of 
differing trades have contracts directly with the owner.  This is in 
contrast to a GC-type contract, where the owner only has a 
contact with one contractor (GC), and the various trades are 
subcontractors to the GC.  The MP-type contract requires much 
more involvement and sophistication on the part of the owner. 
4. Design-Build, Fixed Price (DB-FP) is a contract between an owner 
and a single entity that will both design and build the project, all 
for a fixed fee.   
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5. Design-Build, Reimbursable (DB-R) is similar to above, but with a 
cost-plus or GMP structure. 
6. Turnkey, Fixed Price (T-FP) is similar to design/build, except the 
single entity also provides financing for the project.  The owner 
simply pays for the building at completion. 
7. Turnkey, Reimbursable (T-R) is similar to above, but with a cost-
plus or GMP structure. 
8. Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) is similar to a turnkey situation, 
except the single entity responsible for design, construction, and 
financing also operates the building for a period of time before 
turning over possession to the new owner. 
Gordon also enumerates the three “drivers” affecting the organization 
selection:  project drivers, owner drivers, and market drivers.  Although 
owner drivers, such as the owner’s construction sophistication, and 
market drivers, such as the package size of the project, are important in 
the choice of a contract, it is the project drivers that most affect the 
contract as it relates to the design.  The project drivers are listed as time 
constraints, flexibility needs, preconstruction service needs, financial 
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constraints, and design process interaction.  It is the latter that becomes 
the most important driver in the context of this thesis: 
Owners must assess how much interaction they want to 
have with the designers during the design of the project.  
This interaction is normally important to owners if the 
design is intended to be highly creative, the appearance is 
critical and/or its ability to serve a function is essential.  
With an independent designer, as used with a general 
contactor, a CM [construction manager], or multiple primes, 
the owner has complete interaction and control over the 
design. (199) 
When interaction between designer, owner, and contractor is important, 
as is the case in creative or unique buildings, Gordon suggests avoiding 
Design/Build fixed price contracts, Turnkey fixed price, and Build 
Operate Transfer contracts. (Figure 3.3.1) Although design interaction is 
an important part of creating a “good” building, additional flexibility (i.e. 
the ability to make changes any point in the design or construction of the 
project) and pre-construction advice (i.e. relying on the expertise of the 
contactor during design) are also important.  Together, all three allow for 
the creation of the most unique, creative building possible.  Thus this 
author has expanded Gordon’s chart to highlight these drivers, and the 
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contracts that satisfy all three drivers.  (Figure 3.3.1)  From this 
analysis, it is clear that fixed-price contacts are not advisable, nor are 
build-operate-transfer contracts.  Fixed price contracts are not advisable 
as they provide no incentive for the contractor to work economically, nor 
do they provide an incentive for architects to spend the extra time 
needed to design ‘good’ buildings.  The risk of cost over-runs rests 
solely with the contractor and the designer, as unforeseen changes cost 
the owner nothing.   
Drivers 
GC-
FP GC-R CM MP 
DB-
FP DB-R T-FP T-R BOT 
Fastrack Schedule  ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ 
Sequential Schedule ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ 
More Flexibility  ∎ ∎ ∎  ∎  ∎  
Less Flexibility ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ 
Pre-Construction Advice 
Needed  ∎ ∎  ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ 
No Pre-Construction Advice 
Needed ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ 
Design Interaction ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎  ∎  ∎  
Less Design Interaction ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ 
Construction Financing Needed       ∎ ∎ ∎ 
Permanent Financing Needed         ∎ 
Owner Financing ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎    
Figure 3.3.1:  Compatibility of Various Contracting Methods with Project Goals 
and Requirements 
Source:  Adapted from Gordon   
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Therefore, the advisable contract method for building good buildings is 
one where the architect or contractor are reimbursed for their time 
multiplied by a previously agreed-upon multiplier.  However, as a 
reimbursable contract shifts a greater portion of the design and 
construction risk to the owner, his or her return should be higher to 
compensate them for the increased risk.  Thus well designed and 
constructed buildings, especially ones built under a reimbursable 
contracting method, should show a greater return than a building of 
more questionable design or construction quality. Otherwise there is no 
incentive for the developer to expose himself or herself to the increased 
costs and risks associated with quality design. 
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4.0 CASE REVIEWS:  BOSTON MULTIFAMILY HOUSING 
Developers in Boston have recently become aware of the power of 
design.  Boston’s housing boom that began in the mid-Nineties was 
followed closely by a construction boom of new multifamily units.  As 
demand increased and more and more developers attempted to cash in 
on the boom, it became increasingly important for projects to 
differentiate themselves through design.  This has become especially 
true as sites with unique locations or outstanding views have become 
less and less common, for it is now suddenly left to the architect to 
create the uniqueness of the property.  Uniquely designed buildings 
seem to enjoy not only a price premium, but faster absorption rates, and 
reduced approval time, all of which equate to an increased return to the 
developer.   
This section of the thesis looks at some highly successful recent 
projects in the Boston area.  As both developers and architects tend to 
be cautious about divulging budgets, line items and returns, only 
publicly available information has been used in an attempt to determine 
a link between positive press (and thus pointing to unique and quality 
design) with increased per square foot condo sales prices (representing 
a capitalization of design expenditures into the sales price).  While it is 
impossible to determine the extent to which good design contributed to 
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the success of these projects without quantitative study, an important 
theme arises from this cursory review of successful, well-designed 
projects:  users respond to design and are willing to pay for it.   
This section will finally conclude with a discussion of the views of local 
architects and developers concerning the value of quality design on 
residential projects in Boston. 
4.1 Atelier 505 at the Boston Center for the Arts 
Project Facts:  
• Developer The Druker Company, Ltd. 
• Design Architect Machado and Silvetti Associates 
• Managing Architect of Record ADD, Inc. 
• Contractor Turner Construction 
• Completed June, 2004 
• Program 400,000 gross square feet 
50,624 square foot lot 
• 103 market-rate condominiums 
• 15,000 sq. ft. of retail space 
• 5,000 a sq. ft. restaurant 
• 375 vehicle parking spaces 
• 350 seat proscenium theatre 
• 200 seat “black box” theatre 
• Location Boston, Massachusetts (South 
End Neighborhood) 
• Total Project Cost $100 Million 
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In 1995, Boston’s mayor, 
Thomas Menino, established a 
task force to determine 
guidelines for the development 
of a predominant yet vacant 
brownfield lot in the South End 
neighborhood of Boston.  The 
mayor and the BRA (Boston 
Redevelopment Authority, the 
owners of the parcel) sought to guarantee a project that would create a 
“worthy architectural presence,” while at the same time expanding the 
existing cultural facilities of the BCA (Boston Center for the Arts).  The 
project had to be compatible with the community interests of local 
residents and nearby businesses, along with the city of Boston as a 
whole. According to Boston Homes, “Anything developed on the site 
would serve not only as a landmark to the South End but as a gateway 
to the Back Bay as well.” (Jackson, 2004) 
Although five developers responded to the city’s request for proposals, 
the president of Druker himself admits that it was the design of the 
building that won the project for his company.  The proposal’s design 
acknowledged the South End's 18th century architecture through use of 
brick and building forms, while at the same time created a thoroughly 
 
Figure 4.1.1:  Façade from Tremont Street 
Source:  Chaloner Associates 
  62
 
 
modern building that spoke of the South End’s future. Druker’s proposal 
was unique in that all other developers proposed historicist copies of the 
existing Victorian row houses. "I think our building has an opportunity to 
become the real focal point of what the South End is about, which is 
people living there, shopping there and the arts,"  said Druker.  
(Jackson, 2004) 
Druker hired the internationally renowned Boston firm of Machado and 
Silvetti to design the project, along with the Cambridge-based firm of 
ADD, Inc. Frederick Kramer, AIA, Principal at ADD, Inc. said, 
"Atelier/505 is a 
sophisticated design 
solution to a very 
challenging site. It's [sic] 
varied program 
elements accommodate 
a number of needs from 
over 100 condominiums 
to the creation of first-
class performance space for the Boston Center for the Arts and The 
Huntington Theater, active retail uses at street level, public open space, 
and below grade secure parking for residents and others visiting the 
South End area. The complex design and construction issues were 
Figure 4.1.2:  View of Model from Tremont Street 
Source:  high-profile.com 
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tackled head-on in a highly collaborative fashion by an exceptional 
group of architects, interior designers, engineers, and construction 
professionals resulting in what will be yet again another landmark 
project for The Druker Company and a welcome addition to the 
developing fabric of the City of Boston. "  
Machado and Silvetti tackled the design not only as a discreet piece of 
architecture, but with an understanding of the importance the building 
would have on the urban fabric of the neighborhood: 
The new building treats the entire city block 
as a conceptual unit divided into many 
buildings orchestrated relative to one 
another with the BCA's Cyclorama dome as 
the architectural centerpiece. The new 
building mass steps back from the face of 
the Cyclorama along Tremont Street, 
exposing the building's copper dome to the 
street. This stepping back also creates a 
triangular public plaza, animated by 
landscaping, paving patterns, café seating, 
shopfronts, display windows, and lobby entrances. This 
plaza is a simple stage-like surface for activities that spills 
 
Figure 4.1.3:  Tower Detail 
Source:  Machado and Silvetti Architects 
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from the building. The architecture reinforces this activity by 
its mix of program and by its activation of the street, with 
multiple entrances to retail, housing, and public functions. 
The new construction is designed to read as several 
volumes, rather than as a single monolithic building, in 
order to allow for transitions in scale and to echo the nature 
of the South End fabric. 
The building was very well received by the press and the public alike.  
Despite a glut of high-end condos that became available at the same 
time as Atelier’s, the units were 90% sold before construction was even 
half complete, 18 months 
ahead of schedule.  The 
condo presales were so 
successful that, despite a 
flagging economy, Druker 
was able to raise prices and 
sell out the entire building 
before construction was 
complete.  (Witkowski, 2004)  
Although the building offered 
many amenities, such as parking and a 24-hour concierge, the condo 
sales at Atelier broke many records, selling units for more than  
Figure 4.1.4:  Aerial View of Model 
Source:  high-profile.com 
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$1,000 a square foot and penthouse units for more than $3.1 million.  
The design architects name was used extensively in marketing 
literature, and some people actually bought units specifically because of 
the designer.  Most buyers, even if they did not recognize the name of 
the architects involved, were impressed by 
the design, and chose to purchase there 
because of it.  Although its prominent 
location and a long list of amenities 
contributed much to the success of the 
building, it is clear that the outstanding 
architecture and urban design was a large 
part of that success. 
 
Figure 4.1.5:  Tower Façade 
Source:  Machado and Silvetti Architects 
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4.2 The Residences at the Ritz-Carlton Towers 
 Project Facts:  
• Developer Millennium Partners  
• Design Architect Gary Edward Handel + 
Associates 
• Managing Architect of Record CBT/Childs Bertman and 
Tseckares 
• Completed May, 2001  
• Program 1.8 million gross square feet 
• 309 market-rate condominiums 
• 191 room five star hotel 
• 63 rental and extended stay units 
• 19 screen movie theater 
• 100,000 sq.ft. health club 
• 50,000 sq.ft. retail space 
• Parking garage 
• Location Boston, Massachusetts 
(Midtown) 
• Total Project Cost $515 Million 
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Completed in 2002, the two towers that make up the Ritz-Carlton 
complex are as “un-Boston” as they could be.  Located across from the 
Boston Commons, the United State’s oldest public park, with a view of 
the State House and Beacon Hill, the towers are thoroughly modern in 
their massing, form and materials.  In contrast to the simple, puritan 
brick structures of Beacon Hill, the tower complex is a collection of 
stainless steel, glass, granite, and metal panels.  In spite of, or perhaps 
because of, the fact that the 
buildings are not in the 
‘typical’ Boston style, all 
309 market rate units sold 
quickly and for a 
considerable premium.   
The project has not only 
been a success for the 
owners, but for the 
surrounding community as 
well.  Located in the former “Combat Zone,” or red-light district, of 
Boston, the area is now a hot-bed of development.  A near-by historic 
opera building has recently been restored, along with countless other 
new developments.  Susan Hannon, a deputy director at the Boston 
Redevelopment Authority, said that the Ritz-Carlton “really was a 
Figure 4.2.1:  View of Towers from Boston Commons 
Source:  Boston.com 
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catalyst” for downtown 
improvement.  In fact, the 
project was awarded a 
Charter Awards from the 
Congress of New 
Urbanism in 2002.  The 
award, founded in 2001 “to 
promote virtues such as 
‘coherent regional 
planning, walk-able 
neighborhoods, and 
attractive, accommodating 
civic spaces,’” was given to the Ritz-Carlton Towers and 17 other 
projects out of more than 200 entries.  Christopher Jeffries, co-founder 
and principal of Millennium Partners, recognizes the value the unique 
architecture played in the success of the project:  
 “It's great to receive professional recognition for your 
projects and CNU's Charter Award feels especially 
gratifying, since the Congress embodies the highest ideals 
of contemporary urban planning and design. The jury 
represents the best thinking on modern urbanism,” said 
Jeffries, He added thanks to architect Gary Handel, Blake  
Figure 4.2.2:  Aerial View of Towers 
Source:  CBT Architects 
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Middleton and the entire 
design team for 
representing “the perfect 
design partnership in 
executing our development 
model with particular 
sensitivity to quality of life 
issues in an urban setting.” 
 “Our current projects - in 
Boston, New York, 
Washington, San Francisco, 
Miami - are all similarly 
aimed to advance 
downtown, neighborhood lifestyle and commerce at the 
highest level through a mixed-use combination of the best 
lodging, residences, entertainment, retail, dining and 
recreational activity,” Mr. Jeffries said. “Although this award 
singled out our work in Boston, it deserves to be shared 
with all of our ventures. Certainly the Charter Award will 
help keep our eyes on the prize as we continue to practice 
our own brand of new urbanism around the country.” 
(__,Millennium Partners Press Relesase,1) 
Figure 4.2.3:  Façade at Street Level 
Source:  freefoto.com 
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4.3 Laconia Lofts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Completed near the end of 1999, 
the Laconia Lofts building is a 99-
unit, new construction loft building 
in Boston’s South End.  The award-
winning architect, David Hacin, 
says the building is meant to 
"evoke the old New England mill 
buildings with their strong brick 
presence and horizontal bands of 
Project Facts:  
• Developer Laconia Associates (Jack 
McLaughlin) 
• Design Architect Hacin + Associates 
• Managing Architect of Record Conyngham Associates 
• Contractor Suffolk Construction 
• Completed November, 1999 
• Program 160,000 gross square feet 
• 99 loft-style condominiums 
• 6 ground floor commercial 
condominiums 
• 79-car underground parking 
• Location Boston, Massachusetts (South 
End Neighborhood) 
• Total Project Cost $18 Million 
Figure 4.3.1:  View from Washington Street 
Source:  Hacin + Associates 
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windows interrupted by vertical circulation elements." The project met its 
low-income quota by selling 45 units to qualified artists at half the 
approximately $200-per-square-foot price of the other units. The 
architect points out that while traditional low-income "set asides" 
demanded by most cities discourage wealthier buyers; those who want a 
loft see the presence of “creative types” as an added attraction.  
Ultimately the project sold very 
well, considering it was the 
first building of its kind on 
Washington Street, an old 
section of Boston that was, 
until Laconia spurred 
development, a rather 
dangerous and foreboding 
area of the city.   
4.4 Differing Views on the Value Design 
The supply within the market for good buildings responds to user 
demand; an increase in demand will be followed by a change in supply 
and, at least in the short-run, an increase in price.  However, in order for 
the developer to supply “more” quality architecture, he must demand 
more input from architects.  As the supply curve for the inputs of 
Figure 4.3.2:  Building Penthouse 
Source:  Hacin + Associates 
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development, including design, is upward sloping, as the “amount” of 
design quality supplied increases, the price should also increase.  
Simplistically stated, in a competitive market, a better building should 
cost more to design, more to produce, and more to buy (or rent).11    The 
developer’s return is based on the user’s willingness to pay within the 
market for buildings, so if demand rises, and the developer’s return 
increases, he or she should demand more quality architecture.  While it 
is impossible to predict the design quality of any building before it has 
been designed, developers can increase their chances of obtaining a 
good design by hiring architects and planners with a reputation for 
quality design.  These are usually architects that have won awards or 
have been published in national design magazines, and they have 
usually built a successful building of a similar type before.12   
 
11 At least in the short run. 
12 Although there must always be a first time.  Atelier 505 was actually the first 
multifamily residence designed by Machado and Silvetti.  The firm does, however, 
have much experience in institutional residence halls such as the Weiss College 
dormitory at Rice University. 
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Thus as the user’s demand for good buildings rises, the developer’s 
demand for good architects should rise as well.  It would be expected 
that an architect with a proven record of good design would increase the 
developer’s chance of providing a good building, and would thus be able 
to charge higher rates as a result of the increased demand for his or her 
services, and yet that is not always the case.  “My experience is that 
bad and good architects end up charging more or less the same fees,” 
says an employee of the Boston Redevelopment Authority. 
Ironically, ‘good’ architects can actually end up making less than ‘bad’ 
architects.13  Most projects are fixed fee, which, in the absence of other 
incentives such as increased reputation, is a poor contributor to quality 
design.  However, fixed fees are the norm because there are a large 
number of architects competing for the work of only a small number of 
sophisticated, business savvy developers.  In most private, commercial 
situations, it is the developer that has the most bargaining power, which 
drives down architectural fees.  Fees are eventually driven so low that 
 
13 At least in the short run on a per-project basis, assuming the same fixed fee for the 
same project. 
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architects will take any job simply to stay afloat.  An architect, however, 
is always thinking about his or her reputation, for there are both financial 
and psychological benefits to a good reputation.  Thus with a fixed fee 
contract, the architect who cares more about his/her reputation than the 
bottom line, and wants to create a good building at any cost, will 
continue to work even if it means the fee has ‘run out.’  The ‘bad’ 
architect, who views the design of a building merely as a business 
opportunity rather than an artistic and creative endeavor, will actually 
stop work on a project before the fee runs out, thus earning money while 
the good architect looses money.14 
Thus the value of good architecture differs between individual 
stakeholders.  For some developers, there is a psychological benefit to 
creating good buildings, while for others there is merely a financial 
benefit.  It is, however, the developers who view the benefit of good 
architecture as both financial and psychological that will strive to create 
 
14 This, of course, assumes the architects are of equal efficiency and reach the same 
level of design at the same time.  In this example, the ‘good’ architect continues to 
work to create the best product, while the ‘bad’ architect ceases production. 
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the best buildings.  It is the developers, who understand both the short-
term financial returns and the long-term psychological returns to good 
design that will be willing to invest the most. 
Likewise architects have differing views of the value of design.  For 
some, the psychological benefits such as reputation and awards are 
greater than the financial benefits.  These are the architects who will 
strive to create the greatest buildings at any cost, possibly losing money 
along the way.  However, as long as they can stay in business, they will 
continue to create quality architecture as demanded by developers, the 
users, and the community.     
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5.0 CONCLUSION 
In examining the market functions of the users, developers, and 
suppliers of good design, this thesis has shown the effect of good 
design on real estate property values.  What’s more, good design has 
shown to provide value in multiple ways:  first, good design can actually 
command a price premium on a project.  If the cost of the design is less 
than the price premium gained, good design can actually have a positive 
effect on the financial returns of the building.   
Price effects are not the only benefit to good design; there are indirect 
benefits as well.  Good design has shown to increase the visibility of a 
project, providing a ‘cache’ to users and owners.  Good design has also 
been used as a marketing device, and can increase absorption and 
decrease vacancy.   Finally, good design has been shown to have a 
positive effect on surrounding property values and bystanders.  Good 
design can be a catalyst for economic development, and in turn make 
people feel safer in their communities.  Taken as a whole, the returns to 
good design are immense. 
What is unclear is the cost of providing good design.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the some architects can actually charge a 
premium for their design services, while others, in the face of increased 
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competition, cannot.  That premium, however, is based on both the 
current market conditions for architectural services, as well as the 
relative name-recognition of the architect amongst the general public.15  
Well-known architects and designers like Philippe Starck, Frank Gehry, 
or Richard Meier can charge a much higher premium than the average 
local architect.   
It seems that, to a point, this premium is capitalized into the value of the 
property.  However, literature reviewed in this thesis suggests an 
“optimal” level of planning such that either an increased or decreased 
spending on design would result in a decreased overall return.  This, 
however, can only be shown through qualitative analysis.   
 
15 Name recognition among developers and the design community seems to have little 
effect on the fees architects are able to charge.  Architects must be known by the 
general public to truly command a generous price premium for their services. 
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5.1 Qualitative Study Proposal:  Determining Optimal Design 
Values 
As stated previously, the market for architectural services is unclear.  
Some practitioners view the service as a commodity; one architect’s 
service is identical to another’s.  This can often be the case in simple, 
standard buildings such as warehouses or self-storage units.  The 
name-recognition or cache of the architect plays no role in the value of 
the property, and so one would expect the market value of such services 
to be driven to the marginal cost of providing the service, and would 
ultimately become a zero-sum game for architects.   
However, some projects do rely on the name recognition of the architect 
for more effective marketing, faster lease-up and absorption, and an 
actual price premium on each unit sold or leased.  This fact points to a 
market for architectural services that is differentiated such that the 
‘better’ providers are able to charge more than the ‘less qualified’ 
providers. 
What is also true from anecdotal evidence is that better buildings take 
longer to design.  This is the case due to the increased time required to 
study alternative designs, increased reliance on consultants, and an 
increased use of staff.   Ultimately good design is not free, but there 
  79
 
 
appears to be a positive return that is correlated with an increased 
spending of time and/or money on achieving good design.   
Thus there appear to be two potential proxies for good design:  money, 
or dollars spent on design, and time, or hours spent on design.  The 
latter assumes that additional man-hours spent on design are necessary 
to create high quality architecture.  The former assumes an efficient, fair 
market for architectural services such that better architects get paid 
more, and thus hiring a better architect, and (potentially) obtaining a 
better building, should cost a larger percentage of the total project 
budget than would a lesser building designed by a lesser architect.  And 
while this is not always the case, as discussed above, there is always a 
cost associated with design, and there should exist an optimal level of 
spending for any given project. 
The former proxy, time, is an adequate proxy due to the fact that better 
buildings take longer to design.  Good building designs go through much 
iteration, as no architect can design the ‘perfect’ building on the first try.  
As more hours are spent refining and experimenting with the design, the 
potential for achieving a high-quality design rises.  The flaw of this proxy 
is that it assumes all architects are of equal talent and skill, and thus the 
only variable of quality is time spent on design.  This, however, is not 
always the case, as more talented architects can design a high-quality 
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building in a shorter time frame than can a less talent architect.  
Nevertheless, many developers view architectural services as a 
commodity rather than differentiated services, and so, from the 
perspective of the developer, time is the only variable.  This proxy is a 
particularly strong choice in cases of fixed fee contracts; money spent 
on design is no longer a variable, leaving time as the only variable to 
affect design.  As stated before, even in the face of a fixed fee contract, 
the better architect usually values his/her (long-term) reputation over 
(short-term) revenue, and will therefore spend more time on design.  
Finally, data for this proxy is easy to collect as most architects carefully 
record man-hours spent on each project, and for each phase of the 
project.  Through regression analysis of time spent on design versus 
sales price, optimal man-hours could be determined for any time of 
project, and for any phase of design.        
The latter proxy assumes that the developer is willing to pay for the 
potential of obtaining a better design, and that better architects cost 
more.  It does not necessarily assume that the better architect spends 
more time on design, which eliminates the potential error of the previous 
proxy where good architects might take less time to arrive at a quality 
design.  This proxy, taken from the view of the owner, is an accurate 
picture of the development process; the developer is only concerned 
with the quality of the design and cost of obtaining such quality.  
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Ultimately the best proxy is a combination of both time and money.  
Dollars spent per hour and number of hours used as independent 
variables will eliminate a majority of flaws previously mentioned, while 
continuing to convey all the proxy characteristics of good design.  This 
variable is particularly strong under cost-plus or variable contracts, as 
the dollar figure (money) accounts for the economic value of the 
architect and any aspect of quality that can be attributed directly to the 
architect, and the hour figure (time) accounts for that aspect of quality 
that can be attributed to time spent on design.  In order to compare 
design costs of buildings against each other, it is necessary to 
determine the economic value of the design spending, not the design 
spending itself.  As stated previously, architects are not always paid for 
the value that they produce, especially in fixed price contracts.  
However, the economic value (V) of the design is value of one hour 
under a fixed price contract, times the number of man-hours spent on 
the job: 
   H
h
F V ×

=  (5.1.1)
… Where V is the total economic value of the design, F is the total  price 
fee (fixed or variable) to the architect, h is the estimated number of 
hours from which the fee is determined, and H is the actual number of 
man-hours spent on the design.  This equation allows any contract to be 
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calculated as a cost-plus figure, regardless of the actual negotiated 
structure.  In the case of a cost-plus contract, h and H would be equal, 
as the architect’s fee is based on the actual number of hours worked.  
Thus in a cost-plus or variable contract structure, the fee paid to the 
architect is equal to the economic value of the design.  In the case of a 
fixed fee contract, where the economic value of the design is not 
necessarily equal to the fee, F/h is the contracted hourly rate, H is the 
actual number of hours spent on design (which could be more or less 
than h) and V is the economic value.  
The economic value V of the design can then be regressed as an 
independent variable against multifamily housing sales to determine an 
optimal economic spending on design.16  Single family units will be 
disregarded; the theory being that a home-owner who builds their own 
house can determine their own optimal level of design before committing 
to a project. For multi-family projects, the hypothesis is that the value of 
design is concave; a developer who spends nothing on design (0% of 
 
16 Any property or type or tenure choice, such as commercial leases or residential 
rents, would provide a valid independent variable. 
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total construction costs) or the entire budget on design (100%) will 
obviously have no building, and thus make nothing in return.  Ultimately, 
this future study hopes to determine the optimal level of design fees, 
below which a developer could make more money by increasing design 
costs, and above which a developer is losing money and should 
decrease the quality of design. 
Through a hedonic regression of Boston area multifamily condo sales as 
compared to each unit’s pro-rata share of total (economic) design costs 
as a percentage of total (actual) project costs, it is the hypothesis of this 
proposed study that the outcome will be similar to the aforementioned 
optimal planning studies.  As mentioned previously, this total design 
cost should be parabolic in nature, and  by taking the derivative of this 
total design cost with respect to price, an ‘optimal’ economic design cost 
(as a percentage of total development costs) can be determined. 
The data set for the left-hand side of the equation, or dependant 
variable, is price.  Data for condo sales in Massachusetts is publicly 
available, and therefore only involves identifying the projects to be 
studied and their addresses.  This data set will also include some of the 
independent variables against which the price variable will be 
regressed, such as time and location.  It is necessary to control for all 
other amenities that are not affected by design costs, such as distance 
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to public transportation or distance from parks or the CBD, which can 
easily be determined by mapping each project using GIS.  It is also 
crucial to choose projects that fall within a similar set of market 
conditions, either at the top or the bottom of the market, or to include a 
dummy variable for each to control for the possibility that good design is 
not capitalized, but only a means of differentiation during adverse or 
positive market conditions.  This variable can be determined by graphing 
the project’s completion date on an accurate graph of historic house 
prices. 
Finally, the required data for the right-hand side of the equation is the 
proxy for quality design: the economic value of the project.  For privately 
funded projects, this figure is not publicly available, and would be 
necessary to obtain from developers or architects. It will also be 
necessary to determine the total development budget and total square 
footage for each project.   
Ultimately this data will be collected via survey.  After identifying 
projects that fall within the confines of the study (multifamily Boston area 
developments within one time frame or market condition), a survey will 
be conducted of both developers and architects of each project.  
Economic values from completed surveys will then be added to sales 
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price data and regressed to determine optimal soft cost expenditure for 
the Boston area. 
In conclusion, this figure will only determine the optimal economic level 
of spending on design based on the design’s private value; it will not 
determine the socially optimal level of design spending because it does 
not take into account the value of design to parties other than the end 
users.  In a perfectly functioning market devoid of any externalities, the 
amount of design demanded by developers would be the economic 
value of the design, and the architect would be compensated based on 
his or her cost of providing this design.  This, however, may never be 
the case; as long as architects continue to focus on design and 
developers continue to focus on business, there will always be an 
imbalance between two.  Developers will continue to negotiate for fixed 
fee contracts, and architects will continue to accept them in the face of a 
competitive market.  Nevertheless, by understanding the value of 
design, and the economically and socially optimal level, developers and 
architects might move a bit closer to the center, with the architect 
understanding the costs and limitations of design, and the developer 
understanding its immense value.  
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